浅谈农村土地侵权案件的执行

近年来，由于国家出台一系列鼓励农民种地的优惠政策，使广大农民更加珍惜土地。随之而来，法院受理土地侵权案件大量增加。土地侵权案件执行阻力大，回弹性强。处理不好，极易造成暴力抗法，加深当事人之间的矛盾，不利于社会的和谐。
一、农村土地侵权案件的类型
一是相邻关系纠纷，退出土地的执行。农村土地是指农民集体所有和国家所有依法由农民集体使用的耕地、林地、草地以及其他依法用于农业的土地。农村家庭承包的土地是农民赖依生存的基本保障，农民不仅靠它提供基本生活保障而且靠它承担教育子女等费用，土地经营权是农民安身立命的根本。由于相邻土地之间因土地边界变化引起的侵权纠纷，法院判令侵权一方退出土地，侵权人或其他人拒绝退出的。
二是判令侵权人停止对宅基地的侵权。物权法第152条规定，宅基地使用权人依法对集体所有的土地享有占有和使用的权利，有权依法利用该土地建造住宅及附属设施。这类案件大多涉及宅基排水、房屋遮光、退出土地。
二、执行土地侵权案件应遵循的原则
一是坚持说服教育，促其自动履行。由于农民的法律意识淡薄，法律法规理解不透，认准一个理。家庭势力观念强，顾及面子，对法院的判决结果抵触情绪较大。总是想方设法不履行判决。对于此类案件在执行过程中必须考虑执行效果与社会效果相结合。尽管当事人在诉讼阶段未达成协议，但在执行阶段，执行人员必须耐心做好双方当事人及其家属的思想工作，坚持以说服教育为主，耐心听取双方当事人的诉愿。调阅诉讼卷宗，找准争议的焦点，查清事实，审查判决是否存在问题。如在执行过程中发现判决存在问题，应及时按法定程序暂缓或者中止执行。对于判决事实清楚被执行人必须退出土地的，执行人员仍要坚持做好和解工作。执行员应邀请与当事人有特定关系、在村屯有威望的人员进行调解、说和。
二是依靠有关部门协助执行，严格按照法定程序进行。判决退出土地案件若需要强制执行，法院必须按法定程序执行。制定周密的执行方案，在执行通知书限定的期限内未自动退出的，应发出强制退出土地公告，退出的时间应选择在庄稼收获之后播种之前完成。在强制过程中应邀请有关部门专业人员、当地派出所公安人员及村委会领导到场协助，执行人员应严格控制事态的发展。对拒不配合、妨害执行的人员要果断采取措施，及时带离执行现场。法院按照判决的内容，经专业人员确认后，重新作出划分标记交付给申请执行人。整个执行过程，要有详细的视听资料。有被邀在场人签字。对被执行人拒不履行判决的，法院应及时将有关材料移送公安机关立案侦查。并将判决结果公布于众。以警示他人。
三、对妨碍执行土地侵权案件的处理
由于土地侵权案件的执行，不同于金钱债务的执行，它是属于行为的执行，案件执行结案后，判决执行的内容极易恢复到执行前的状态。
一是判决已执行完毕，被执行人又将争议的土地恢复到执行前状态，一些执行人员答复申请执行人案件已结，应另行诉讼。其实这种做法缺少法律依据。应予继续执行。最高人民法院执行办在2001年1月2日对天津高院的答复中指出：被执行人对法院已执行的标的又恢复执行前的状态，虽属新发生的侵权事实，但是与已生效法律文书认定的事实并无区别，若申请执行人另行起诉，法院将重新判决，增加当事人的诉累及法院的审理负担。因此，对于被执行人将争议土地恢复到执行前状态的行为认定是对已执行标的的妨害行为，适合罚款或拘留的强制措施。对申请执行人要求排除妨害的，应继续按原生效法律文书执行。
二是判决已执行完毕，被执行人的亲友或其他案外人继续阻挡申请执行人耕种土地、建造房屋等。主要表现为被执行人的亲友认为生效的判决只是对被执行人有约束力，对自己没有约束力。亲友以自己的名义来对抗执行。例如判决被执行人甲退出侵占申请执行人乙50厘米宽的耕地。案件执结后，甲与其亲属丙协议，甲将耕地转包给丙经营，丙在法院判决执行完毕后又侵占乙15厘米宽的耕地。
对于案外人出面妨碍权利人行使权利的情形。笔者认为，应区分不同情况予以处理，如果是被执行人的亲友以侵权人主张的未被法院采纳的理由为借口阻止权利人行使土地使用权的，可对其按照拒不履行人民法院判决或以其他方法阻止司法工作人员执行公务直接采取排除妨碍强制执行措施。如果案外人认为判决确有错误而主张权利，阻止原判决确定的权利人行使土地使用权的，可告知其在规定的时间内，有向法院提出异议的权利。如果案外人在告知的期限内未提出异议，或者提出的异议明显不成立被法院裁定驳回后，案外人又不依照民事诉讼法第204条进行诉讼的，却继续阻止权利人行使土地使用权，可以对其直接采取强制措施，排除妨碍。如果案外人提出异议经法院审查认为原判决确有错误的，案外人的异议理由成立，裁定中止对该标的的执行，并对原判决进行再审，经再审后认为原判决事实不清，撤销原判决的，人民法院裁定终结执行。原判决再审后予以维持的，裁定恢复对原判决的执行，案外人继续妨碍执行的，可直接对其采取强制措施。如果案外人在案件执行结案后提出异议的，执行机构不予审查，应另行诉讼解决。
作者：黑龙江省北安市人民法院 韩召峰
Chapter VIII
Strengthening of the Multilateral System


Art. 23 of the DSU deals, as indicated by its title, with the “Strengthening of the Multilateral System”. Its overall design is to prevent WTO Members from unilaterally resolving their disputes in respect of WTO rights and obligations. It does so by obligating Members to follow the multilateral rules and procedures of the DSU. Art. 23 of the DSU reads:

“Strengthening of the Multilateral System
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;
(b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings; and
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of time.”

In this section, to end this book, the author means to take a precise overlook on the nature of obligations under Art. 23 of the DSU as a whole by referring to two panels’ reports in part. In this respect, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules: 1
“On this basis [provision of Article 23], we conclude as follows:
(a)It is for the WTO through the DSU process - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine that a WTO inconsistency has occurred (Article 23.2(a)).
(b)It is for the WTO or both of the disputing parties, through the procedures set forth in Article 21 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement DSB recommendations and rulings (Article 23.2(b)).
(c)It is for the WTO through the procedures set forth in Article 22 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine, in the event of disagreement, the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations that can be imposed as a result of a WTO inconsistency, as well as to grant authorization for the actual implementation of these suspensions.
Article 23.2 clearly, thus, prohibits specific instances of unilateral conduct by WTO Members when they seek redress for WTO inconsistencies in any given dispute. This is, in our view, the first type of obligations covered under Article 23.
Article 23.1 is not concerned only with specific instances of violation. It prescribes a general duty of a dual nature. First, it imposes on all Members to ‘have recourse to’ the multilateral process set out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In these circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one could call ‘exclusive dispute resolution clause’, is an important new element of Members' rights and obligations under the DSU. Second, Article 23.1 also prescribes that Members, when they have recourse to the dispute settlement system in the DSU, have to ‘abide by’ the rules and procedures set out in the DSU. This second obligation under Article 23.1 is of a confirmatory nature: when having recourse to the DSU Members must abide by all DSU rules and procedures.
Turning to the second paragraph under Article 23, Article 23.2 - which, on its face, addresses conduct in specific disputes - starts with the words ‘[i]n such cases’. It is, thus, explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1.
Indeed, two of the three prohibitions mentioned in Article 23.2 - Article 23.2(b) and (c) - are but egregious examples of conduct that contradicts the rules and procedures of the DSU which, under the obligation in Article 23.1 to ‘abide by the rules and procedures’ of the DSU, Members are obligated to follow. These rules and procedures clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.
Article 23 interdicts, thus, more than action in specific disputes, it also provides discipline for the general process WTO Members must follow when seeking redress of WTO inconsistencies. A violation of the explicit provisions of Article 23 can, therefore, be of two different kinds. It can be caused
(a)by an ad hoc, specific action in a given dispute, or
(b)by measures of general applicability, e.g. legislation or regulations, providing for a certain process to be followed which does not, say, include recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system or abide by the rules and procedures of the DSU.”
Furthermore, as to Art. 23 of the DSU, the Panel in US-Import Measures (DS165) confirms the ruling developed in US-Sections 301-310, and states: 2
“The Panel believes that the adopted Panel Report on United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (‘US - Section 301’) has confirmed the crucial importance that WTO Members place on the dispute settlement system of the WTO, as the exclusive means to redress any violations of any provisions of the WTO Agreement. This fundamental principle is embedded in Article 23 of the DSU: …
An important reason why Article 23 of the DSU must be interpreted with a view to prohibiting any form of unilateral action is because such unilateral actions threaten the stability and predictability of the multilateral trade system, a necessary component for "market conditions conducive to individual economic activity in national and global markets" which, in themselves, constitute a fundamental goal of the WTO. Unilateral actions are, therefore, contrary to the essence of the multilateral trade system of the WTO. As stated in the Panel Report on US - Section 301:
‘7.75 Providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system is another central object and purpose of the system which could be instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the Preamble. Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most important instruments to protect the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and through it that of the market-place and its different operators. DSU provisions must, thus, be interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner which would most effectively enhance it.’
The structure of Article 23 is that the first paragraph states the general prohibition or general obligation, i.e. when Members seek the redress of a WTO violation, they shall do so only through the DSU. This is a general obligation. Any attempt to seek ‘redress’ can take place only in the institutional framework of the WTO and pursuant to the rules and procedures of the DSU.
The prohibition against unilateral redress in the WTO sectors is more directly provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23. From the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the chapeau of Article 23.2 (‘in such cases, Members shall’), it is also clear that the second paragraph of Article 23 is ‘explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1’. That is to say, the specific prohibitions of paragraph 2 of Article 23 have to be understood in the context of the first paragraph, i.e. when such action is performed by a WTO Member with a view to redressing a WTO violation.
We also agree with the US - Section 301 Panel Report that Article 23.2 contains ‘egregious examples of conduct that contradict the rules of the DSU’ and which constitute more specific forms of unilateral actions, otherwise generally prohibited by Article 23.1 of the DSU.
‘[t]hese rules and procedures [Article 23.1] clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.’
The same Panel identified a few examples of such instances where the DSU could be violated contrary to the provisions of Article 23. Each time a Member seeking the redress of a WTO violation is not abiding by a rule of the DSU, it thus violates Article 23.1 of the DSU.
In order to verify whether individual provisions of Article 23.2 have been infringed (keeping in mind that the obligation to also observe other DSU provisions can be brought under the umbrella of Article 23.1), we must first determine whether the measure at issue comes under the coverage of Article 23.1. In other words, we need to determine whether Article 23 is applicable to the dispute before addressing the specific violations envisaged in the second paragraph of Article 23 of the DSU or elsewhere in the DSU.
Article 23.1 of the DSU provides that the criterion for determining whether Article 23 is applicable is whether the Member that imposed the measure was ‘seeking the redress of’ a WTO violation. …
The term ‘seeking’ or ‘to seek’ is defined in the Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary as: ‘to resort to, … to make an attempt, try’. This term would therefore cover situations where an effort is made to redress WTO violations (whether perceived or WTO determined violations). The term ‘to redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as ‘repair (an action); atone for (a misdeed); remedy or remove; to set right or rectify (injury, a wrong, a grievance etc.); obtaining reparation or compensation’. The term ‘redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as: ‘reparation of or compensation for a wrong or consequent loss; remedy for or relief from some trouble; correction or reformation of something wrong’. The term 'redress' implies, therefore, a reaction by a Member against another Member, because of a perceived (or WTO determined) WTO violation, with a view to remedying the situation.
Article 23.1 of the DSU prescribes that when a WTO Member wants to take any remedial action in response to what it views as a WTO violation, it is obligated to have recourse to and abide by the DSU rules and procedures. In case of a grievance on a WTO matter, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the only means available to WTO Members to obtain relief, and only the remedial actions envisaged in the WTO system can be used by WTO Members. The remedial actions relate to restoring the balance of rights and obligations which form the basis of the WTO Agreement, and include the removal of the inconsistent measure, the possibility of (temporary) compensation and, in last resort, the (temporary) suspension of concessions or other obligations authorised by the DSB (Articles 3.7 and 22.1 of the DSU). The latter remedy is essentially retaliatory in nature.”



【NOTE】:
1. See, in detail, WT/DS152/R/7.38-7.46.
2. See, in detail, WT/DS165/R/6.13-6.23.



List of References

1 Sources of Legal Texts: http://www.wto.org; WTO Secretariat: The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures (Second Edition), CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2001.